The Philadelphia axis is in our hands: the takeover of the axis and its implications

Good news – the IDF announced that it had gained operational control of the Philadelphia axis. During the takeover, 20 tunnels were located crossing from Egypt to the territory of the Gaza Strip, while 82 underground shafts were located near the axis that will be explored in the coming days. It was also discovered that Hamas had placed dozens of rockets, some of them long-range, At close ranges of only 10-40 meters from the axis, with the intention of preventing Israel from attacking so close to the Egyptian border.

We returned to the Philadelphia axis: this is what the IDF found in the Hamas stronghold All the information that can be told
“You can move hostages through the tunnels”: the key area that everyone ignores

Some will disagree with me, but in my opinion this is Israel’s first significant strategic achievement in this war, which is a shame that our operative planners did not make sure to achieve it at the beginning of the ground maneuver. This is also the strategic turning point in the campaign in Gaza. It can be said, without exaggeration, that the Philadelphia axis was the “strategic depth”, the “city of refuge” and the “granary” of Hamas at the same time, and the central anchor for everything we call the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip.

The occupation of the entire axis, with the exception of a small completion that is still required in the area near the Mediterranean coast, is a physical but also a mental move that has far-reaching implications for the survival of Hamas, the conduct of the war and the role of Egypt.

In front of Hamas – as long as the axis was active, it and the area adjacent to it would function as the organization’s “strategic depth” – a sort of city of refuge. It was clear to Hamas that the war would end with it bruised and geographically reduced, but surviving, in an area where the IDF would not enter if Hamas’ efforts to stop the war were successful, and that the supply of IDF and ammunition to continue the war and restore its military power the day after would definitely be possible. This, while at the same time many of the civilian goods that entered through this axis arrive via the highway via humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, thus freeing up time and space in the tunnels for managing the supply of the supplies in Hamas’ possession – and we have already seen that money was not a factor.

Now, “the faucet is turned off.” It will take some more time, but it will be possible to see the pressure of Hamas increase. At first gradually, and then exponentially. An aggressive “weapons economy” will be activated, and this will come very close, perhaps more than any military move from which it can be recovered, to the dismantling of Hamas as a government-ruling system, and perhaps even paves the way for a new hostage deal under improved conditions.

The relationship with Egypt

For many years, but even more so during the war, Egypt functions with three hats.

One hat, officially – is a border state with official levers of pressure on Hamas (Rafih crossing), an ally of Israel and the US and a partner of Israel in the regional strategic vision and policy towards Gaza.

Second hat, officially – an “objective” mediator in the negotiation efforts with Hamas and a “natural” partner in trying to define “the day after”.

A third hat, unofficially – under Israel’s nose, it enables an entire industry of smuggling tunnels from its territory to the territory of the Gaza Strip and in practice constitutes the organization’s “oxygen pipe” and a main source for it of illegal weapons, ammunition and prohibited materials that made possible the establishment of “Lower Gaza”. The peak was In the existence of an overpass between Egypt and Gaza – the Salah al-Din crossing which was used for the movement of goods from Egypt to the Gaza Strip without any Israeli or international supervision. It was not widely publicized, and operated in addition to the famous Rafah crossing.

Apparently the economy of the tunnels/goods/crossings and the industry that developed on Egyptian soil contributed quite a bit to the industrial peace that Egypt asked to preserve in the Sinai Peninsula, and hence the Egyptian interest in not eliminating it, as Egypt knew how to do in many other cases.

Now, the IDF has violated the conduct of silence in the Philadelphia axis, and has returned to control the Gaza side, while beginning to publicly expose the conduct of the axis for years and the responsibility that Egypt has on the other side of the border and its actual contribution to the power and status of Hamas – even if it is a passive contribution that has zero interest This is probably also the reason for the very loud Egyptian opposition to the Israeli operation in Rafah in recent weeks.

And what now?

As for the “day after” – Israeli control of the axis is the starting stone in the ability to separate the Gaza Strip from the IDF and the ability to establish Israeli security control in the Strip. This is a first-rate strategic lever that places Israel in a different, significantly improved place, in the discussions that will take place about “the day after” and the role of civilian and international bodies, including regarding Egypt’s role as an important ally of Israel and the demands from it as a neighboring country within the framework of written agreements backed by the US and the international community, which for some reason have so far avoided mentioning Egypt in the context of Gaza and have avoided From exerting pressure on it to close the “oxygen pipe” to Hamas that passes through its territory.

At the same time, the military effort and the IDF’s takeover of the Philadelphia axis do not stand alone, and now it is necessary to act in parallel and combined efforts. First of all, to photograph and show the world, with an emphasis on the USA, what the Philadelphia axis is. To show the tunnels passing from Egypt to the Gaza Strip, and the “quiet” Salah al-Din crossing as an essential basis like no other for continued Israeli security control of the route, I dared on his part even the next day.

There is no doubt that the closure of the axis will sentence Hamas to an “arms economy” and as time goes by will limit its ability to respond with fire. Precisely at this point, it is very essential to start pushing his ruling foot, to activate the civil effort in the north of the Gaza Strip and to take responsibility for the distribution of humanitarian aid and for the creation of humanitarian bubbles in which Hamas is no longer relevant.

This strategic turning point in the war in the Gaza Strip is significant, and will allow Israel, for the first time, to begin directing time, attention and resources to other arenas.

Lt. Col. Amit Yegur is the former deputy head of the Palestinian arena in the planning division of the IDF and a former senior officer in the Naval Intelligence